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A persistent and sizeable literature argues that the reported job dissatisfaction of union 
members is spurious. It reflects either the sorting of workers across union status or the sorting 
of union recognition across jobs. We cast doubt on this argument presenting the first 
estimates that use panel data to hold constant both worker and job match fixed effects. The 
estimates demonstrate that covered union members report greater dissatisfaction even when 
accounting for sorting in both dimensions.  Moreover, covered union members are less likely 
to quit holding job satisfaction constant and their quit behaviour is far less responsive to job 
satisfaction. The paradox of the discontented union member remains intact. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The last two decades have witnessed an explosion of interest by economists in the job 
satisfaction of workers.  While studying the influence of unions on job satisfaction has been a 
crucial part of that explosion, it actually predates it (Hammermesh 1977, Freeman 1978 and 
Borjas 1979). The longevity of this interest stems from what many see as a basic 
contradiction.  Unions are associated with better earnings, better benefits and, arguably better 
means for dealing with worker grievances but at the same time unions are associated with 
lower job satisfaction.  This has given rise to a wide variety of alternative explanations for 
this apparent paradox.  These often start by recognizing the voice function of unions, but 
conclude that while unions may be associated with dissatisfaction it is not because unions 
cause dissatisfaction. The findings and their implications are diverse and often contradictory 
justifying yet more empirical investigation. 
Previous resolutions of the paradox fall within two broad categories of arguments 
related to the sorting of workers and of union recognition itself. First, unions attract 
inherently dissatisfied workers and once this is corrected for, unions are not associated with 
dissatisfaction. These union workers would have been dissatisfied even in non-union jobs. 
Second, union jobs are genuinely worse and the dissatisfaction reflects negative 
characteristics that outweigh the wages, benefits and protection. Critically, the jobs that are 
genuinely worse attract unions and once this is corrected for, unions are not associated with 
dissatisfaction. Workers who were not members of a union would be just as dissatisfied with 
these jobs.  While we will review studies within these broad categories, our ultimate objective 
is to provide new evidence on both the influence of unions on job satisfaction and the 
influence of unions on quit behaviour.  Using longitudinal data for the United Kingdom we 3 
 
find that neither of these two categories of explanations prove powerful enough to explain the 
basic paradox.  
Our individual fixed effects estimates suggest that sorting and the attraction of the 
inherently dissatisfied seems unlikely. Job satisfaction drops as a given worker moves from a 
non-union to a union position.  While union jobs may genuinely be worse in some 
dimensions, if this was pervasive, one would anticipate union workers to be more likely to 
want to change jobs and more likely to quit.  Our evidence shows just the reverse, they are 
less likely. More critically, we find that when specific jobs change their union status, the 
satisfaction paradox remains. This status change continues to influence the job satisfaction of 
the workers matched to those jobs. Thus, neither sorting of union status across jobs nor of 
workers seems the source of the paradox.  Finally, we show that the expression of 
dissatisfaction is most, and perhaps only robustly, evident among those union members 
covered by collective bargaining. Thus, we suggest that the classes of theory proposed to date 
do not satisfactorily hold together all the relevant empirical evidence. While voice 
phenomenon are no doubt important, the way in which they work to generate superior 
working conditions, reduced quits and job dissatisfaction has not been adequately captured. 
 
2.  SETTING THE CONTEXT 
The idea of union voice sits at the base for most explanations of the paradox of union 
discontent. Trade unions provide a collective voice alternative to quitting (Freeman and 
Medoff 1984) and must mobilize or encourage discontent as a necessary prequisite for 
successfully making demands of the firm (see Booth 1995).  Unions create a “climate of 
complaint” as a tool to improve the work environment for workers. Borjas (1979) suggests 
the discontent may not be “genuine” but a “device” designed so the workforce can be heard.  4 
 
Bender and Sloane (1998) disagree, arguing that employees recognize that survey 
interviewers will not reveal answers to the firm and thus have no incentive to exaggerate 
dissatisfaction.  Freeman (1980) clearly suggests that the discontent is genuine, claiming that 
the voice function encourages workers to stay in jobs they do not like and improve their 
working conditions from within.  Yet, the jobs, as measured by worker satisfaction, do not 
get better.  Indeed, Artz (2010) uses longitudinal data to confirm that dissatisfaction actually 
grows as a worker’s tenure in a unionized job grows.   
The first category of explanation for the paradox is that union members express 
dissatisfaction because naturally dissatisfied workers are more likely than others to join a 
union. As Clark (1996: 202) argues, “If unions address issues of worker dissatisfaction, the 
more dissatisfied will be the most attracted to union membership.”  In this view, there exists 
an individual-specific element of job satisfaction that has a distribution across potential 
workers. If unions create a “climate of complaint,” expect their ranks to be filled with 
complainers.  
Several researchers have studied this sorting problem by instrumenting the union 
membership variable in cross-sectional individual data. Using U.S. data, Borjas (1979) and 
Kochan and Helfman (1981) found that the predicted union membership variable continued 
to be a statistical significant and negative partial correlate of satisfaction. They conclude that 
worker sorting is not a crucial issue. Miller (1990) using Australian data, found that the 
predicted union membership variable became statistically insignificant arguing in favour of 
sorting. Using UK data, Bender and Sloane (1998) use a key variable on worker perceptions 
of management to instrument membership. They suggest that the negative effect of 
membership is greatly reduced when accounting for sorting. Using the matched employee-
employer data of the UK WERS, Bryson et al. (2004) use simultaneous estimation and strong 5 
 
establishment controls to instrument for union status finding that the dissatisfaction of union 
members is “a selection effect, rather than a causal effect.” In an ambitious study using a later 
wave of WERS, Bryson et al. (2010) pay particular attention to the interplay of bargaining 
coverage and membership finding that membership effects on satisfaction depend on that 
interplay.  They confirm that sorting explains the apparent difference between members and 
non-members who are covered but find that among uncovered workers union members have 
lower satisfaction.  This is a variant on previous results in that it argues that for the core of 
covered members satisfaction is no lower. It is only for the uncovered members who 
presumably want a covered job that dissatisfaction does not reflect sorting. 
As an alternative to instrumenting membership in cross-sectional estimates, Heywood 
et al. (2002) use rudimentary longitudinal techniques to account for the supposed individual 
dissatisfaction effect.  Using the first four waves of the British Household Panel Study (1991 
– 94), they show that the dissatisfaction of union members remains in pooled regressions, 
simple difference equations that should remove the fixed effect and in linearized fixed effect 
models. They conclude that “sorting and individual effects do not explain reduced 
satisfaction in union jobs (605).” 
This may not be surprising if the key element of sorting is not across individuals but 
across jobs.  The second broad explanation of the paradox argues that union jobs are 
inherently less pleasant than non-union jobs. Indeed, that is the reason they are unionized.  
The union didn’t create the unpleasant aspects but, instead, was a response to them. Duncan 
and Stafford (1980) argue that unions arise in exactly those circumstances in which workers 
share adverse working conditions.
1 Thus, Hirsch (1993) and Hirsch and Macpherson (1998) 
present evidence suggesting that the union wage premium in the US trucking industry largely 
reflects a compensating differential for poor working conditions.  In an effort to bring this 6 
 
logic to the issue of job satisfaction, Gordon and DeNisi (1995) examine the difference in job 
satisfaction and quit rates within three U.S. bargaining units containing both union and non-
union workers.  They found no differences by union membership.  Thus, either the unions 
provide “voice” to non-union members or, more likely they claim, non-union members in the 
bargaining units share job conditions that generate similar levels of satisfaction for otherwise 
equal union and non-union members.  
To the extent that many of the worker sorting models include establishment or job 
level controls as instruments, they are implicitly recognizing this second type of sorting 
across jobs. Indeed, both Borjas (1979) and Bender and Sloane (1998) explicitly identify this 
as reverse causation. Inherently worse jobs are more likely to be unionized. This logic would 
seem to require not a mixture of firm and individual controls to examine membership but a 
focus on the firm characteristics that lead to unions winning elections (Saks and Farber 
1983).  Moreover, the individual membership decision ultimately depends on a worker both 
searching for a union job and being offered a union job (Abowd and Farber 1983). As a 
result, reduced form probability estimates of the sort used in the literature cannot model 
which characteristics cause a worker to “choose” a unionized job.  Instead, it is a mixture of 
worker and firm characteristics that tend to be associated with membership with little hope of 
disentangling the two. 
Yet, the separate ideas of sorting across workers and firms may profitably inform 
longitudinal estimates in a fashion not previously considered in this context.  Individual 
worker fixed effects allow the examination of how a change in membership or coverage 
status influences the job satisfaction of a specific worker hopefully eliminating the influence 
of sorting across workers.  Similarly, match specific fixed effects (capturing all years a given 
worker has held a particular job) allow the examination of how a change in membership or 7 
 
coverage influences the satisfaction of a worker with the job (and presumably its 
characteristics) held constant.  This may eliminate the influence of sorting across jobs.  Our 
study is the first to use a relatively long panel of UK workers to investigate the influence of 
both membership and coverage on the job satisfaction of workers. We do so controlling for 
worker fixed effects, then match fixed effects and ultimately for both types of fixed effects.  
Our conclusion is that the fundamental paradox of covered union members reporting relative 
dissatisfaction persists.  This leads us to suggest that sorting of workers or of union coverage 
is not a large part of the explanation.   
Finally, we show that the same covered members who express dissatisfaction even when 
accounting for fixed effects are also those least likely to want to look for new jobs and least 
likely to actually quit.  Previous work confirms that lower job satisfaction is associated with 
both an increased probability of intending to quit and of actually quitting (Clark et al. 1998, 
Clark 2001 and Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen 2004). While not without exception, 
union members are typically found to be less likely to quit holding job satisfaction constant.
2  
Yet, Clark (2001) has suggested that the critical dimension may be the responsiveness of quit 
behavior to job satisfaction. We show that covered workers and especially covered union 
members are least responsive. Thus, the paradox remains.  Union members (especially 
covered members) express the least satisfaction, are the least likely to quit and their quit 
decisions are the least responsive to changes in job satisfaction. 
 
3.   DATA 
We draw data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a nationally representative 
sample annually interviewing approximately 10,000 individuals from roughly 5,500 
households. We use all twelve waves from 1996-2007. Earlier waves (1992-1995) only asked 8 
 
questions regarding certain key job characteristics, including some related to union 
membership and coverage, for individuals who changed jobs. As a consequence, we omit 
these earlier waves rather than utilise data where key variables may suffer from measurement 
error. 
Information on union status comes from two sources in the BHPS.
3 First, the 
employment section annually asks workers (in sequence) whether they are in workplace that 
is covered by a union (cover) and then whether they are a member of this union (covered 
member). While this allows a distinction between covered members and non-members, all 
other workers are simply grouped into uncovered. Second, the BHPS values and opinions 
section (biannually) asks whether individuals are a member of a union (union(v)). The 
information from across these two sources can be combined to create an indicator of 
uncovered union members (uncovered member) with uncovered non-members being the 
base. In our results we demonstrate and discuss the robustness of our estimates to the choice 
of membership information used.  
All job satisfaction questions in the BHPS are reported on a 7 point Likert scale, 1 
being the least satisfied, 7 the most satisfied. At different times a variety of job satisfaction 
questions have been included in the BHPS. The overall job satisfaction question (“How 
satisfied are you with your job”) is asked of respondents throughout the BHPS sample period, 
but the questions regarding certain domains of job satisfaction changed markedly from 1998 
onwards.  Four domain specific job satisfaction questions are available for this period: 
satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with hours worked, satisfaction with job security, and 
satisfaction with the work itself.
4 We restrict our sample to those aged 20 to 65 and exclude 
the self-employed and those with missing data. This yields an unbalanced panel of 73,515 9 
 
individuals. Sample statistics are provided in Table A1. The variables displayed represent 
typical controls from the literature on job satisfaction. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 1> 
Table 1 presents average job satisfaction levels according to different categories of 
union membership and coverage. The first three columns reflect the union membership and 
coverage categories derived from the employment section of the BHPS. These demonstrate 
that covered union members are significantly (p-val = 0.00) less satisfied with their work than 
both covered non-members and workers without coverage. The second three columns reflect 
the categories of the values section. These allow disaggregation of workers without union 
coverage into members and non-members at the cost of a smaller sample size. Again, covered 
union members are less satisfied with their jobs than covered non-members. They are also 
less satisfied than uncovered non-members. Finally, union members without coverage are 
less satisfied than union members with coverage, however this group is relatively small (only 
468 person-time observations). 
 
4.  METHODOLOGY 
Job satisfaction of worker i at time t can be represented as the following wellbeing (Wi) 
function (f) : 
                                                     Wi = f(Ui,Zi,Xi,)       (1) 
 Where Z is a vector of hedonic work characteristics and X is a vector of personal 
characteristics.  U is a vector of union membership and coverage variables. Given the 10 
 
centrality of controlling for worker and job match fixed effects, we take the ranking of job 
satisfaction to be more nearly cardinal.  We rely primarily on probit adapted ordinary least 
squares (POLS) as developed by Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008 p. 29 - 34).  This 
approach follows the demonstration by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) that while fixed 
effects can be critical in estimating the determinants of satisfaction, the assumption of 
cardinality instead of ordinality of the responses to satisfaction questions is typically 
unimportant. While we briefly confirm this for our own results, the computational ease of 
POLS allows greater ease in accounting for fixed-effects and running robustness checks when 
utilising panel data.  
Implementing POLS begins by deriving Z values of a standard normal associated with 
the cumulative frequencies of the k different categories of the dependent variable. Then the 
expectation of a standard normally distributed variable is taken for an interval between any 
two adjacent Z values. Thus if the true unobserved continuous variable is W
* where the 
observed Wi = j if uj-1< Wi* < u j for j=1,2..k then the conditional expectation of the latent 
variable is given by: 
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Where n is the standard normal density and pj=N(uj )- N(uj-1),j=1,...k-1. This approach 
allows the application of ordinary least squares on the conditional expectations. Critically, 
with panel data POLS easily allows for the inclusion of fixed effects. 
This ultimately leads to the estimation of the following equation: 
         itk t ik i it it it itk W ε σ η α δ γ β φ + + + + + + + = Y Z X U       ( 3 )  11 
 
Where φ  is the intercept, U is a vector of union membership and coverage covariates, X is a 
vector of personal characteristics, Z is a vector of work characteristics,  i α  are individual 
specific fixed effects,  ik η are match specific effect for work i in job match k,Y a series of year 
dummies and  itk ε an IID error term. To aid interpretation we use trade-offs within estimated 
equations to identify the relative magnitude of variables of interest, unionization in our case. 
5.  BASIC RESULTS 
The initial results in Table 2 pool all years 1996 to 2007 presenting estimates of job 
satisfaction with clustered standard errors at the worker level. The parsimonious estimate in 
column 1 reveals a statistically significant negative coefficient for covered union members.  
The estimates of the union coefficients increase with the controls which initially include 
those from Table A1, one-digit industry and occupational controls and year dummies. As a 
judge to the magnitude, the estimate in column 2 implies that the dissatisfaction of covered 
union members can be eliminated only with an increase in earnings of 3.43 log points 
(.144/.042). While this suggests a large degree of dissatisfaction by union members, it might 
be argued that wages and union status should not both be explanatory variables as they are 
related. Yet, we find no evidence that the union influence on wages is obscuring the influence 
of unions on job satisfaction.  While higher wages increase job satisfaction, removing wages 
from the estimates in Table 2 does not change the size or significance of the union 
coefficients. 
 The final estimate in Table 2 adds to the controls a series of working conditions.
5 
Two points seem pertinent. First, while in this more complete specification, covered non-
union members report lower satisfaction, the far larger negative influence is among those 
who are covered members. Second, the addition of controls for working conditions in the 
final estimate does not alter the coefficient for covered members.  If a large portion of union 12 
 
dissatisfaction flowed from underlying poor working conditions, one might have anticipated a 
decline in the union coefficients. The coefficient for covered members is unchanged and that 
for covered non-members actually increases substantially.  
<INSERT TABLE 2> 
In further unreported estimates (available on request) we investigate the robustness of 
our results across various relevant sub-samples. First, in light of the high proportion of 
covered public sector workers evident in Table A1, we re-estimate model (III) for public 
sector and non-public sector workers separately. The pattern of sign and significance of the 
union variables remained the same as that reported in Table 2. We then estimated the models 
separately by gender and could not reject the null that the point estimates are identical by 
gender for the two union coefficients. Finally, we re-estimated the models by size of the firm, 
splitting at greater or less than 100 workers. While the negative effect of being a covered 
union member remains, it was noticeably larger in smaller firms, -0.165 [0.021] compared to 
-0.094 [0.023]. The negative influence of being a covered non-member was only present for 
workers in small firms.
6  
A basic concern with even these simple pooled estimates is that the excluded 
reference group is all uncovered workers regardless of union membership. Ideally, one would 
want to separate this reference group into uncovered members and uncovered non-members. 
Bryson et al. (2010) argue this distinction is important as it uncovered members who are the 
only union members genuinely dissatisfied.  In order to make this distinction we supplement 
the coverage information from the employment section of the BHPS with the additional 
indicator of union membership drawn from the values section. Using this additional indicator 
we can identify both covered and uncovered union members as well as both covered and 
uncovered non-union members.  13 
 
Table 3 shows estimates using these alternative union variables while including all the 
other controls as in the last column of Table 2. For brevity we report only the relevant 
estimates.  In the first column, we include the new indicator of union membership taken from 
the values section, member(v). The estimate reveals a large negative association between 
membership and job satisfaction. In the next column we use the new membership variable 
and the original coverage variable mimicking our earlier estimate of the influence of covered 
members and covered non-members on job satisfaction. Again a large negative relationship 
between being a covered member and job satisfaction is apparent, with a smaller negative 
coefficient for covered non-members.  In the final column we show the full specification 
identifying each of the membership and coverage categories. The new omitted category is 
uncovered non-members. The estimates reveal that members (either covered or not) report far 
less job satisfaction than uncovered non-members. Covered non-members also continue to 
show less job satisfaction but the result is more muted. 
<INSERT TABLE 3> 
  In the pooled data we have reported a robust negative relationship between job 
satisfaction and unions, one that is more strongly related to actual membership rather than 
coverage. Yet, as emphasized, such associations may be spurious due to unobserved variation 
in the types of workers who choose to join unions. If the inherently dissatisfied join unions, 
the association reflects sorting not causation. Here we exploit the panel dimension of the 
BHPS introducing worker fixed effects. The results in the top panel of Table 4 report worker 
fixed effect estimates that otherwise mimic the final columns from Table 2 and Table 3. In 
the first estimation the original split of covered members and non-members are compared to 
all uncovered workers.  The point estimate for covered members falls as a result of the fixed 
effects but retains a similar order of magnitude and high statistical significance. The 
coefficient on covered members drops substantially from the pooled estimate and is not 14 
 
significantly different from zero. Thus, the primary implication remains that membership is 
associated with dissatisfaction.  Moreover, the dissatisfaction does not flow from union 
members being inherently less satisfied as the current estimate is identified by observing the 
same worker changing membership status over time. 
<INSERT TABLE 4> 
The second column presents a similar pattern using the four-way split of membership 
and coverage.  The covered members remain significantly less satisfied than the uncovered 
non-members. Indeed, the coefficient is very similar to that in the first column.  The 
coefficient associated with covered non-members again drops substantially when compared 
to the estimate of its size that did not account for worker fixed effects.  Now this is matched 
by a similar drop for the coefficient associated with uncovered members which drops to a 
fifth of the point estimate size without accounting for worker fixed effects. Neither the 
coefficient for covered non-members nor that for uncovered members is statistically different 
from zero. Thus, accounting for worker fixed effects makes clear that the focus for a union 
influence on job satisfaction should be among covered union members.  The fact that this 
relationship persists in the face of worker fixed effects suggests that the sorting of workers 
across union status is not the source of the apparent union dissatisfaction. 
The second theoretical contention is that union dissatisfaction reflects the fact that 
jobs more likely to be unionized have working conditions associated with lower job 
satisfaction. Thus, workplaces where conditions are more dangerous or less pleasant generate 
lower job satisfaction and it is these conditions that led to the jobs becoming unionized in 
first place. In this view, workers would report lower job satisfaction in these jobs independent 
of union status and it is the job, not the union, causing the dissatisfaction. Controlling for the 
non-random sorting of workers will not eliminate the spurious negative correlation in this 
case. It is necessary to hold the job constant and watch a workers change status within that 15 
 
job. While the BHPS does not identify jobs as units of observation, the job history files allow 
for the identification of job matches. A job match is identified every wave that a given 
worker holds the same job. We generate fixed effect estimates that hold job matches constant. 
Thus, the variation in the role of unionization on job satisfaction is measured by status 
changing within specific matches.  As the time frame is not overly long, it seems unlikely that 
job conditions change dramatically over the match and the fixed effect estimate should hold 
these job conditions constant. 
In Table 4 we now present the fixed effect estimates using the match specific fixed 
effects and the original coverage based definitions of unionization.
7 The first set of results in 
the lower panel includes fixed effects for job matches but not for workers. These estimates 
demonstrate a large and significant negative coefficient associated with being a covered 
union member.  Indeed, the size of the coefficient remains nearly the size from the pooled 
analysis in Table 2.  The size of the coefficient on the covered non-members drops in half 
relative to the pooled estimate but does remain statistically different from zero.  Finally, in 
the last estimate in Table 4 we simultaneously account for worker fixed effects and job match 
fixed effects.  This represents an attempt to control for both sorting of workers and the sorting 
of union status across jobs.  The coefficient for covered union members declines relative to 
previous results but remains negative and with a t-statistic of over 3.  Accounting for the 
combination of sorting by workers and the sorting of union coverage across jobs does not 
alter the conclusion that covered union members report lower job satisfaction.  This increases 
the likelihood that the dissatisfaction is genuinely and directly associated with covered 
membership.
8 
The result for covered non-members in Table 4 is also noteworthy.  When controlling 
for both worker and match fixed effects, the coefficient retains size and a t-statistic of over 
1.5 but switches sign indicating that covered non-members report, if anything, greater job 16 
 
satisfaction.  This switch requires accounting for both types of sorting but hints that the most 
satisfied are those who have the benefits of coverage but not the costs of membership. Our 
examination of satisfaction with various job aspects will repeat this pattern. Such results fit 
with the view that covered non-members free-ride on the gains of unions without contributing 
the effort, time and energy required as a member of the union. Past empirical literature 
typically estimates free-riding as the extent to which covered workers can fully gain the union 
membership wage premium without joining. The evidence on this appears mixed (contrast 
Booth and Bryan 2004 with Budd and Na 2000) but the issue might better be thought of in 
terms of job satisfaction. If participating in the activities of the union requires time and effort, 
the advantages of free-riding may not be captured in wages alone.  Seen this way, the 
difference between the two coefficients in this final column estimates a very large job 
satisfaction advantage to free-riding (.023 - -.047 = .070).  This advantage may help explain 
the growing incidence of such free-riding in Britain (Bryson 2008). 
The critical point of this section is that while cross-sectional estimates suggested that 
many types of worker associations with unions might diminish job satisfaction, the fixed-
effect estimates confirm that only covered members have lower job satisfaction. Thus, the 
true effect that is obscured by sorting is not the neutral or positive influence of membership 
as suggested by several of the instrumental variable estimates in past literature.  If anything 
the true effect obscured by sorting is the increased job satisfaction associated with free-riding 
by covered non-union members.
9 
 
6.  DOMAINS, QUITS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Respondents in the BHPS identify their satisfaction with various aspects, or domains, of their 
job. The responses use the same Likert scale and examining these responses provides 
evidence on the source of the dissatisfaction expressed by union members.  Table 5 17 
 
summarizes fixed effect estimates on the extent of satisfaction with these aspects. Note that 
there is variation in the number of years various aspects appear within our time frame.  The 
estimates that control for only individual fixed effects suggest that covered union members 
are less satisfied than uncovered workers with each aspect of their work.  Yet, this moderates 
with the inclusion of the match fixed effects. Accounting for both types of fixed effects 
reveals that covered union members are significantly less satisfied with their job security and 
the work itself. They are insignificantly different in their satisfaction with pay and hours. 
Interestingly, in the same estimates, the covered non-members are significantly more satisfied 
than uncovered workers with their pay and hours.  Again, we think these latter results hint at 
the potential advantages of free-riding. 
<INSERT TABLE 5> 
If union members are genuinely dissatisfied they might be anticipated to express this 
by quitting.  Yet, the conjecture that they stay put to improve their current jobs is a critical 
part of the exit-voice hypothesis.  As emphasized by Artz (2010), there is no evidence that 
their job satisfaction increases over time with a unionized employer so workers are either 
unable to improve their current job but continue to stay put or they improve their current job 
and it does not result in increased reported job satisfaction. While we cannot distinguish these 
alternatives, we do wish to examine quits as part of isolating the group of workers for which 
the seeming paradox applies most strongly. 
In quit models, Clark (2001) confirms that greater job satisfaction plays a role in 
diminishing the probability of quits even after controlling for a long set of reasonable controls 
including earnings, hours, demographics and family structure. Clark shows that satisfaction 
with job security is particularly important in explaining quits but that this differs by age and 
gender.  As part of his examination of quit behaviour, he explores the role of unionization 
asking "is union job dissatisfaction real?" His basic results indicate that holding job 18 
 
satisfaction (and all other controls) constant union members are less likely to quit. Yet, this 
might be anticipated by the exit-voice hypothesis.  The stronger test to Clark is whether or 
not union members are less sensitive to job satisfaction.  Granting that union workers may be 
less likely to quit, a genuine expression of dissatisfaction should have union member and 
union non-members expressing their job satisfaction in the same way. There should be no 
difference by union status in quitting as a function of job satisfaction (Clark 2001 p. 237).  
His evidence on this is mixed.  He shows that the coefficients on job satisfaction in the quit 
equation are essentially the same for covered union members and the uncovered.  On the 
other hand, he shows that the coefficient on covered non-members is smaller than that for the 
uncovered.  They are less likely to quit for a given decrease in job satisfaction. 
We return to these issues first estimating the influence of union status on both looking 
for a new job and on quits holding job satisfaction and our other set of controls constant.  The 
results in upper panel of Table 6 show that it is the covered union members who are the least 
likely to report they are looking for a new job. Indeed, the uncovered members are actually 
more likely to be looking for a new job than uncovered non-members perhaps to find a 
covered job.  The quit results in the lower panel of Table 6 estimate the probability of quitting 
next period as a function of this period's characteristics. The only significant negative 
coefficient is that for covered union members.  We take from these two estimations that the 
paradox should be fully focused on covered union members.
10  They are the only category 
that consistently reports lower satisfaction when accounting for sorting. They are the only 
category that is significantly less likely to quit. 
<INSERT TABLE 6> 
In Table 7 we examine the samples separately to add to the test by Clark (2001). In 
our estimates we do not constrain the controls to behave similarly across different types of 
union status (we do not simply add interactions). In each case we examine the role of job 19 
 
satisfaction on quits within a particular union status using the full set of controls.  In each quit 
estimate, the suggested influence of greater job satisfaction is a significant reduction in the 
likelihood of quitting.  Yet, the size of the coefficients is illustrative.  The largest reduction is 
among the uncovered.  Covered non-members have an intermediate reduction.  Covered 
members have the smallest reduction.  Indeed, the marginal effects indicate that a reduction 
in satisfaction has only half as large an influence on quitting for covered members as it does 
for the uncovered. 
<INSERT TABLE 7) 
While we are not confident that this necessarily reveals anything about the nature of 
dissatisfaction, it does, again, emphasize the importance of covered union members.  Not 
only are they the least likely to quit for a given level of job satisfaction but their quit 
decisions are the least responsive to changes in job satisfaction. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
A series of papers have tested whether or not the dissatisfaction of union members results 
from sorting.  Many find evidence that it does and so suggest there is no paradox as union 
members react to their job conditions in similar ways as non-members. The basis for this 
suggestion has routinely been instrumental variable models (of varying sophistication) that 
identify variation in one or more dimensions of unionization.  We provide a contrasting 
method to account for sorting by controlling for individual and job match fixed effects in 
panel data. The evidence is robust and convincing that controlling for these fixed effects does 
not cause the dissatisfaction to vanish.  This evidence diminishes the likelihood that reported 
dissatisfaction results from either sorting by workers or sorting of union status across jobs. 
   The second key result from this analysis of job satisfaction is the clear indication that 
the dissatisfaction is uniquely and robustly associated with covered union members. The other 20 
 
categories of union status had coefficients that varied greatly with estimation and tended 
toward small and insignificant when controlling for fixed effects.  Most dramatic was the 
positive result for covered non-members, especially for some of the domains, hinting at the 
benefit of free-riding. 
    The intention to look for work and the quit data continues to round out the paradox.  
Covered union members are significantly less likely to quit with job satisfaction held constant 
and, in a new test, are less sensitive to job satisfaction in their quit behavior.  Thus, the 
dissatisfaction is not generated by sorting but the quit behavior does not reflect the 
dissatisfaction. Thus, our evidence argues that paradox remains with union members less 
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Table 1 Job Satisfaction by Union Status. 
  Employment Section    Values Section 


















Job Satisfaction  5.306  5.376  5.381    5.259  5.164  5.413  5.393 
Obs  23,534  13,687  36,256    9512  468  10073  18577 








Table 2 Job Satisfaction POLS Estimates, BHPS 1996-2007, Employees 20-65 years old 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
Covered Member  -0.087* [0.016]  -0.144* [0.018]  -0.168* [0.018] 
Covered Non-Member  -0.024 [0.016]  -0.043* [0.016]  -0.067* [0.017] 
Male    -0.107* [0.015]  -0.098* [0.017] 
Age    -0.041* [0.004]  -0.039* [0.004] 
Age
2    0.0005*[0.000]  0.0005*[0.000]  
Tenure    -0.001* [0.0003]  -0.001* [0.0003] 
Married    0.091* [0.016]  0.093* [0.016] 
Dependent Child    0.113* [0.020]  0.110* [0.020] 
A Level    -0.126* [0.017]  -0.128* [0.018] 
Diploma    -0.144* [0.027]  -0.148* [0.027] 
Degree or higher    -0.207* [0.021]  -0.212*[0.021] 
Log Wage    0.042* [0.008]  0.034* [0.008] 
Public Sector    0.088* [0.020]  0.049* [0.020] 
Work Hours    -0.008* [0.001]  -0.008* [0.001] 
Overtime Hours    0.002*** [0.001]  0.002** [0.001] 
Temporary Job    -0.162* [0.026]  -0.137* [0.026] 
Manager/Supervisor    0.038* [0.014]  0.033** [0.012] 
Employer Funded Training  0.075* [0.013]  0.066* [0.013] 
Firm Size 50-99    -0.099* [0.016]  -0.102* [0.015] 
Firm Size 100-499    -0.153* [0.017]  -0.156* [0.017] 
Firm Size 500+    -0.132* [0.020]  -0.133* [0.019] 
Year Controls    X  X 
Industry Controls    X  X 
Occupation Controls    X  X 
`Work Conditions’ 
Controls 
    X 
       
r
2  0.001  0.042  0.047 





TABLE 3 Alternative Measures of Unionisation, Values Section, POLS, BHPS 1997-2007. 
 
  (I)  (II)  (III) 
Member (V)  -0.146* 
[0.018]
   








Uncovered Member (v)      -0.167* 
[0.062]
r
2  0.042 0.042 0.042








TABLE 4 Fixed Effects Estimates of Job Satisfaction, BHPS 1996-2007. 
  Worker Fixed Effects 
Covered Union Member  -0.095*  
[0.017] 
 
Covered Non-Member   0.003 
[0.015] 
 
Covered member(v)    -0.094*  
[0.027] 
Covered non member (v)    -0.012  
[0.022] 
Uncovered member(v)    -0.030  
[0.066] 
r
2  0.015  0.014 
Observations  73,515  38,644 
 
  Match FE  Match and 
Worker FE 









2  0.068  0.058 
 





Table 5  Fixed Effects Estimates of Union Coverage and Domains of Job Satisfaction, BHPS 
1996-2007 
   Match FE  Match & Worker FE 
  Security 
Covered Member  -0.146* [0.013] -0.032*** [0.019] 
Covered Non Member  -0.121*[0.014] -0.024 [0.016] 
r
2  0.105 0.080 
  Work Itself 
Covered Member  -0.177*[0.012] -0.098* [0.018] 
Covered Non Member  0.061*[0.013] 0.006 [0.016] 
r
2  0.076 0.059 
  Pay 
Covered Member  -0.038* [0.012] -0.010 [0.017] 
Covered Non Member  -0.006 [0.012] 0.039*[0.014] 
r
2  0.071 0.059 
  Hours 
Covered Member  -0.055* [0.012] 0.006 [0.018] 
Covered Non Member  0.040* [0.013] 0.042* [0.015] 
r
2  0.126 0.085 





TABLE 6 Unions and Quitting, BHPS 1996-2007, Probit Marginal Effects 
  Looking For a New Job 
  (I)  (II) 
Covered Member  -0.020* [0.005]   
Covered Non-Member  -0.004 [0.005]   
Covered Member(v)    -0.018** [0.009] 
Covered Non-Member (v)    -0.015** [0.008] 
Uncovered Member(v)    0.086* [0.031] 
Pseudo r
2  0.090  0.060 
Observations  62306  27,437 
  Quit in Next Year 
  (i)  (II) 
Covered Union Member  -0.014*[0.002]   
Covered Non-Member   -0.002 [0.002]   
Covered Member(v)    -0.009** [0.004] 
Covered Non-Member (v)    -0.001 [0.003] 
Uncovered Member(v)    0.020*** [0.013] 
Pseudo r
2  0.076  0.058 














Job Satisfaction  -0.003*[0.0007] -0.005*[0.001] -0.007*[0.001] 
Pseudo  r
2 0.087 0.066 0.069 




TABLE A1- Summary Statistics, BHPS 1996-2007. UK Employees 
 






Male  0.452  0.449  0.528 
Age  40.879  37.364  36.696 
tenure2  18.663  16.838  16.418 
Married  0.629  0.535  0.503 
Dependent Child  0.176  0.178  0.133 
A Level  0.209  0.230  0.218 
Diploma  0.096  0.090  0.071 
Degree or Higher  0.226  0.199  0.143 
Log Pay  6.742  6.550  6.303 
Public sector  0.586  0.430  0.046 
Hours  34.961  33.736  35.820 
Overtime Hours  4.195  3.406  3.793 
Temporary Job  0.025  0.074  0.042 
Manager/supervisor  0.389  0.336  0.369 
Employer provides 
training 
0.207  0.190  0.138 
Firm Size 50-99  0.277  0.236  0.275 
Firm Size 100-499  0.274  0.276  0.183 
Firm Size 500+  0.252  0.276  0.082 
Annual Increment  0.636  0.579  0.315 
Night Shift  0.025  0.020  0.016 
Shift Work  0.113  0.063  0.051 
Other Non-usual 
hours 
0.075  0.082  0.081 
Flexitime  0.154  0.186  0.094 
Annualised Hours  0.049  0.043  0.033 
Term Time Work  0.040  0.028  0.007 
Job Sharing  0.006  0.005  0.004 




1 See Heywood (1988) for further evidence supporting this view 
2 Hersch and Stone (1990) provide an exception with their case study of the US state of 
Oregon in which union members were insignificantly different than non-members with 
respect to quitting. 
3 See Swaffield (2001) for a discussion of this.  
4 Prior to 1998 questions were also asked regarding satisfaction with the boss and promotion. 
5 Specifically a range of controls available in the BHPS that describe timing of work and pay 
arrangements;  whether the individual worked shift work, night shifts or other non-usual 
hours, flexitime, annualised hours, job sharing and received an annual pay increment.  
6More generally, we emphasize that the basic size and significance of the estimates in column 
3 of Table 2 are robust to a wide variety of variable inclusions and exclusions. Moreover, the 
sign and significance remain virtually identical in actual ordered probit estimates. 
7 The biannual asking of the values definitions greatly reduces both the sample size and the 
variation needed for properly estimating the models. 
8In addition to their complexity, fixed effect ordered probits have the difficulty of potential 
inconsistency (Green 2001).  Nonetheless, the sign and significance of the key estimates are 
not affected by accounting for both individual and match fixed effects in a specialized 
ordered probit routine run in Limdep (E.18.5.10) although convergence depends on the exact 
specification. 
9 Again we estimated the match and worker fixed effects for a series of sub-samples, males vs 
females, public sector vs non-public sector and large vs small firms. In all these estimates 
(available on request) the pattern of sign and significance of the covered union member 
remains as reported in table 4.  33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
10 We have no confidence in quit estimates with our two kinds of fixed effects.  The resulting 
condition logit estimation is estimated on those who either move from not quitting to quitting 
or from quitting to not quitting.  There is no reason to anticipate symmetry.  Moreover, the 
variation is minimal and most crucially every quit is perfectly associated with a change in the 
match specific fixed effect.  In short, the estimations seem meaningless. 